the party with the longest government in Romania. Did he have a cold?

The Hungarian Democratic Union from Romania is a party of political professionals: because it is a proof of professionalism, that of keeping your political formation in power, even if you have never won the elections. Now, the PSD-PNL political majority is showing signs that it no longer needs them, what it needs instead is the satisfaction of its own clientele. It is increasingly difficult for the UDMR to navigate the waters of power, increasingly murky for them.

A quarter of a century at the honey jar of power

The Hungarian politicians in Romania had such an art of negotiation that they secured the longest government in Romania. Neither the social democrats, with all their previous names – starting with the FSN – nor the liberals, had as many years in power as the UDMR gathered: they were directly in the government, or they supported it tacitly and not on free of charge from the parliament, not less than 25 years. Precisely for that reason, it would be surprising to lose it right now and because of a single post. But they will continue to negotiate their positions “in blood”. Because that’s what they do best, and it’s not even a bad thing: imagine what a Hungarian minority without parliamentary representation, “free” to express their aspirations in less calm, legal and ” constitutional”, for over three decades: surely, until now we would have had more repetitions of the bloody scenario from Tîrgu Mureş and less peace in Transylvania.

Now, if the governing alliance thinks that the UDMR has had enough and that it must leave, having the security of a light parliamentary majority, they are obviously committing a mistake with long-term effects. Even the nationalists understood, in some situations, that it is good to keep your “enemy” close. I mean, close to the government. Because the lesson of that “Bloody March” from Tîrgu Mureş, from 1990, with its immense costs, especially on the external level, not only led to the emergence of the SRI, but also created the premises for permanent states of disturbance and inter-ethnic tension in Transylvania. This was avoided by co-opting the political representatives of the Hungarian minority in the government, from the winter of 1996.

It had become clear what the costs of the political isolation of the Hungarian minority would have been. Even though it was in the opposition, from its creation on December 25, 1989 until the November 1996 elections, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania represented the interests of the Hungarian community at the table of power. I remind you, it was the time when the so-called “Red Patrol” reigned in Romania, the formula by which the press of the time called the political and parliamentary collaboration between the PDSR, as the PSD was called during the time of the Văcăroiu government and the Great Romania Party, the PUNR and the Socialist Party of Labor. The former “Fesenists”, who became “social democrats”, had given up to their Romanian nationalist and ex-communist partners (from the party of Verdeţ and Adrian Păunescu) in those days three ministerial positions (for agriculture, transport and justice – for the PUNR), three as secretary of state and a prefect – for the PRM, from 1994 until the end of the following year, when the “red patrol” broke up, as did the protocol signed between them, and at least the party of Corneliu Vadim Tudor entered into a vocal opposition to the regime Iliescu.

UDMR never had such a tough opposition to the government, neither then nor later. Formed as an organization with a cultural platform, which also does politics, by a group of writers and intellectuals grouped around Domokos Géza, himself since his youth with a solid experience of “navigating” the waters of politics during the communist regime ( he was a member of the CC Office of the UTC for a decade, starting from 1956, knowing Ion Iliescu well since then and later became a substitute member of the CC of the PCR, deftly defending the cultural rights of the Hungarian minority, in full national-communism) . In the first three years that he led the Union, Geza managed to establish the internal structures of the Union, on the one hand, and on the other hand to accredit the theme of the autonomy of the Hungarians in Romania and the dispassionate discussion of the cultural and local autonomy of the minority, within constitutional limits , sometimes (during electoral periods) with small “derailments” encouraged and otherwise requested by the electorate, especially in the Szekler areas. With the exception of some scandals caused by nationalists from both sides, Hungarians and Romanians, the topic of autonomy gradually entered the normality of the public debate, especially after the presidency of the UDMR was taken over by Markó Béla, also a writer, almost “designated” as Domokos’ successor Géza, and from him to a politician with the same profile, Kelemen Hunor.

Why should the Hungarians be “condemned to govern” in Romania

The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania is not registered as a political party, but functions as an association, grouping several “platforms” representing all political currents. The political representation in the Parliament is conformed by the assimilation of the national minority organizations with that of the political parties, in the electoral process. The UDMR did not miss any election and passed the threshold, although sometimes there were predictions and even fears of the Hungarians, related to the possibility that the formation that represents them will not enter the Parliament. It happened especially in the case of competition within the minority, in the context where either the radical political group around László Tőkés, or extremists grouped in the Civic Union and then the Hungarian Civic Party offered Hungarians “alternatives” to vote, especially in the area shake But the instinctive unity of the minority, fueled by a propaganda network supported by civic organizations and associations and by the church, regardless of denomination (Catholic or Reformed), always ensured the “necessary minimum” for the UDMR to enter Parliament. And, from here, often to the government. With the exception of the first seven years of Ion Iliescu’s “reign” and the remnants of national communism, expressed in the “red patrol”, as well as one year of the Boc governments, the UDMR has been in power or close to it for a quarter of a century. It was not only due to favorable circumstances, but above all to the quality of the UDMR politicians.

The rest of the political parties, with the exception of the defunct Civic Alliance Party, never had the promotion of the elites in their program. Apart from creating a clientele network, he was not interested in anything. Professional and intellectual ability did not matter in promotion, but an extension of communist political practices was achieved, in which the “file” was replaced by wealth, influence remained influence and files and relationships the same. Competences rarely found their place among Romanian politicians, from the area of ​​the former FSN, of the nationalists and, unfortunately, the historical parties were no exception. PNŢCD, for example, collapsed not so much because of “erosion in the government”, but mainly because of internal erosion on the occasion of the accession to power, on which occasion, in the absence of the moral vector that was Corneliu Coposu, the party attracted a lot of parasites , who simply bought their power and influence and left him when it became obvious that the party would go into opposition. Then, the struggle for power within the party, on its remains, completed the “work”. It was not so much the “infiltration of the Security” (although, of course, that too) that destroyed this party, but rather its own weakness, the fact that it stopped, from a certain moment, counting on the elites – who also left it, choosing their own option – the Civic Alliance Party.

Otherwise, the evolution of the liberals, with better ideologically grounded structures and well past the internal frictions and splits from the years when they were in the opposition, was a constant one, although they did not necessarily cultivate the elites and the quality of political man either. But they didn’t close the door in their face – that’s why the aforementioned Civic Alliance Party merged with the liberals and not with the peasants, when it came to its end. The only constants, in the quality of political performance, regardless of the condition of opponents or participants in the government (because of the opposition, it’s already hard to remember) were the Udemers. There are no parliamentarians in the UDMR, as in the PSD or the liberals, who speak their own language, or the Romanian language, as happens too often in the case of the other parliamentarians. There is no parliamentarian, no former or current dignitary promoted by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, who has a questionable training or diploma, a questionable or “crocheted” CV, and the access to different levels of power, within the party and in the exercise power, where positions are given to him, is in accordance with the training of each of those selected. You will not find, in the case of the Udemers, former waitresses at Apele Române.

Of course, in the current context, in which nationalism and sovereignty have become the political prerogative of a single party, AUR, removing the UDMR from the government would electorally help both the PNL and the PSD. Propagandistically speaking, “it would be good”. Otherwise, their percentage reduction in government, due to the “reduced weight” they have in the parliament, is a childish excuse, both for Ciucă and Ciolacu. Because it is a protocol that was signed and initialed by the three political parties, when this weight was neither lower nor higher. It is, in fact, only about greed and the satisfaction of one’s own political clientele, around an election year in which party expenses increase and ensuring future power costs, proportional to aspirations.

Don’t imagine that, besides the lost post at ANMR, where the Udemers had the only specialist in the field of energy capable of communicating something during the crisis, eclipsing by far the minister himself in the field (and not because Popescu is any light), the UDMR has, for the rest, in the power structures not established. On the contrary. It is certain that, if he will be pushed to withdraw from the government (and a long series of humiliations, or violations of the protocol signed with PSD and PNL could do it), UDMR would take this step following a well-founded calculation. This party, even though it has been in power for so many years, has never been eroded by it, and not only because it is electorally based on an ethnic minority, constantly voting, but also because its representatives have always won the trust of its own electorate, and not only during the short period of the electoral campaign.

Only one conclusion can be drawn: that it is not “auspicious” for the UDMR to leave the government. Not that in 25 years we got used to them being the “hinge” of power. But giving up the UDMR or removing it from the government would give a pseudo-nationalist speech the note of unison and bring back to the surface themes, tensions and fears that we considered buried. On the other hand, the quality of the governing act would definitely decrease, in the positions held by UDMR dignitaries, who, as an exception, are also specialists in the fields they deal with. And, finally, if the UDMR were to be removed in order to get their hands on the positions they occupy, the PNL and the PSD would become one water and earth, practically merging under the same political-ideological standard, that of greed . The only rational decision would continue to condemn the UDMR to government – but what else is rational in Romanian politics, where the alliance between former mortal enemies reigns?